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Archibald Hutcheson M.P. (c. 1 659-1740) was a British politician
who opposed the South Sea Company’s scheme to offer holders of
British government debt its own shares in exchange for their claims
on the state. Hutcheson proposed an alternative scheme to pay off
the entire debt by increasing taxes on land. Despite Hutcheson’s
opposition to the South Sea conversion scheme, it went ahead,
to be followed by the South Sea Bubble and then the bursting of
the bubble with the crash of the London stock market in 1720.
Scholar Richard Dale has argued that Hutcheson predicted the
crash by using sophisticated financial techniques. Refuting Dale’s
view, this article argues that Hutcheson’s posthumous reputation
as a savant is undeserved.
A prolific writer ofpamphlets on financial matters, British parliamentary
member Archibald Hutcheson was a particularly vocal and early critic of the
South Sea Company, which had formed in 1711 to trade with Spanish-held
America.’ Hutcheson especially opposed the South Sea Company’s scheme to
offer holders of British government debt its own shares in exchange for their
claims on the state.2 Despite Hutcheson’s criticisms of the plan, the South Sea
Company forged ahead with the conversion scheme, and shares in South Sea
stock rose precipitously as the stock became the subject of massive public
speculation. According to some sources, South Sea shares at their height were
trading at approximately eight times their par value.3Then, in 1720, the stock
plummeted, and morality tales afterwards focused on the story of the stock
as a “bubble” which eventually had to burst. In the wake of the South Sea
Bubble, Hutcheson became a member of the Committee of Secrecy convened
by the House of Commons to enquire into the debacle. Therefore, it is perhaps
unsurprising that his name lives on in the historiography of this bubble. In his
book The South Sea Bubble (2001), John Carswell lauded Hutcheson as the
“economist M.P.”4 Scholar Richard Dale, author of The First Crash (2004),
eulogized Hutcheson for his opposition to the South Sea scheme, describing
him as “the father of investment analysis.”5According to Dale, Hutcheson,
using sophisticated calculations, had warned the investing public against the 93
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South Sea scheme.6Dale’s thesis, if correct, suggests that investors were acting
foolishly and irrationally, since they had been warned about the dubious
nature of investing in the South Sea Company. Some historians, such as P.G.M.
Dickson, John Carswell and John Sperling, have claimed that the South Sea
Company was a cover for fraud and that the investing public was caught up
in a gambling mania or speculative fever.7 Several economic historians, such
as Peter Garber, Larry Neal and Ann Carlos, have argued that no such mania
really existed and that bubbles can appear even if many market participants
are acting rationally.8 I have argued before that the South Sea Company was
not a front for fraudsters, but an entity with a genuine interest in its debt
management and its monopoly of trade with Spanish America.9Here, I seek
to convince historians to be cautious in giving Hutcheson accolades. While
he published reams of financial calculations, his complicated pamphlets make
little economic sense. Moreover, he had an ulterior motive in disparaging the
South Sea Company. Hutcheson’s opposition to the South Sea scheme stemmed
not from a great understanding of its flaws, but from having an alternative
(and unworkable) scheme of his own relating to land tax.
Far from being a talented economic thinker, Hutcheson was
hidebound by traditional assumptions about the landed elite’s right to power
and wealth. To him, land was not merely an asset or source of income; it also
conferred political and social rights. Hutcheson agreed with the contention of
the political thinker, Anthony Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, that society
should be led by landed gentlemen. Published in 1711 to immediate acclaim,
Shaftesbury’s Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opinions, Times posited that
the new financial class, or monied interest, was not to be trusted to lead the
country.’° Hutcheson concurred.
Archibald Hutcheson favored paying off the national debt entirely,
and as quickly as possible.” According to his rationale, the state was akin to
a private individual, and was better off not in debt. By getting rid of its debt,
the country would enjoy lower taxation and lower interest rates. Perhaps,
however, Hutcheson had other motives in proposing paying off the entire
sum. Certainly, the Jacobite faction had an incentive to reduce the national
debt--to weaken the new regime’s links to the wider economy. Conversely, as
financial historian Bruce Carruthers has noted, a national, rather than royal,
debt would give government creditors an explicit reason to favor the regimes
of William of Orange and his successors, rather than the Catholic Stuart line.12
Creditors could reasonably assume that a Stuart king would not honor debt
contracts made by his enemies. Hutcheson’s motives are unclear but he does
appear to have had links to the Jacobite faction.
For instance, as attorney-general of the Leeward Islands in 1688,
Hutcheson had shown leniency to the Catholic population of the islands.
William III accused him of disloyalty — a charge of which he was cleared.
He retained his post, but returned to England in 1704. Approximately six
years later, Hutcheson became legal adviser to the Duke of Ormond, who had
extensive estates in Ireland. Hutcheson then became Lord Commissioner of
94 the Board of Trade in December 1714. However, he resigned in January 1716,
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after his patron, the Duke of Ormond, was impeached due to his Jacobite
sympathies. Hutcheson’s association with Ormond led him to also being
accused of Jacobitism. Sensitivities were high at the time of the Atterbury
plot, an attempt by Jacobites in 1722 to overthrow the protestant Hanoverian
regime in favour of the Catholic male Stuart line.’3 Nevertheless, Hutcheson
continued to represent Hastings in the House of Commons until 1727, and his
marriage to a wealthy widow, Mary, Lady Gayre, afforded him considerable
financial freedom.’4
Upon the government’s request, Hutcheson became a member of the
parliamentary enquiry into the crash, called the Committee of Secrecy. After
the enquiry ended, the political elite tried to use Jacobite agitations to deflect
public attention from the South Sea scandal. Mter the South Sea Company
directors and a few others had been punished, King George I endeavoured to
stop further enquiries into the scandal. In August 1721, he ended a session of
Parliament with these words:
You are all sensible, that the Discontents occasion’d by the great Losses
that many of my Subjects have sustain’d, have been industriously rais’d
and inflam’d by malicious and seditious Libels; [...] all the Enemies of
my Government, who flatter’d themselves they should be able to take
Advantage from our Misfortunes, and blow up the Sufferings of my
people into Popular Discontent and Disaffection will be disappointed in
their wicked Designs and Expectations.’5
Hutcheson disregarded King George’s wishes and continued to publish
pamphlets criticizing those involved in the South Sea affair. In 1723, by which
time many of his contemporaries had moved on to other topics, he published
another pamphlet on the subject.’6Hutcheson remained fixated on the South
Sea scheme.
Clearly, Hutcheson’s publishing record on the national debt and the
South Sea scheme made him a better choice for membership of the Committee
of Secrecy than a country gentleman with no knowledge of account books
or loans. His prior opposition to the South Sea scheme may also have been a
factor in selecting him. Yet, while Hutcheson often disparaged the scheme in
his lengthy pamphlets, close readings show that he did not, at least initially,
have sound economic reasons to object to the scheme. Rather, he wished to
promote his own scheme to completely pay off the national debt.
As author J.R. McCullough briefly relates in his book A Treatise on
the Principles and Practical Influence of Taxation and the Funding System
(1975), Hutcheson proposed paying off the national debt by levying a tax of 10
per cent on all fixed and moveable property. The proposal also involved lifting
legal restrictions on the sale of land, such as settlements or entails. McCulloch
derided Hutcheson’s plan as “wholly impracticable” and “unjust.”’7 As
McCulloch noted, David Hume, in his Essay on Public Credit, argued that
the tax would be highly regressive and difficult to collect. Hailing Hutcheson
as an “excellent citizen,” Hume said that the proposal was “much approved
of by men of sense, but was never likely to take effect.”8 Hume’s comments 95
Paul
appear to be tongue in cheek. Hutcheson’s scheme would have destroyed the
prospects of those dependent on safeguarded land: heirs and widows. It would
also have reduced the size of landed estates. Neither of these ideas was likely
to be popular with the elite. It is not clear how many people approved of
Hutcheson’s scheme, and what were their political leanings.
Much of Hutcheson’s work falls into the category of polemicaleconomic literature, an area generally overlooked by historians.’9 Amongthe thousands of writings on economics in the Goldsmith’s-Kress Library of
Economic Literature,2°it is difficult to assess how many were widely read or
influential. Likewise, it is almost impossible to know what writings may have
been lost over the years.2’At the time, pamphlets were printed without strong,
protective binding. Sold for small sums or distributed for free, they usually
focused upon topical issues and hence were likely to be discarded once they
became out of date. However, the print runs for some editions were large,
and only one example needed to survive for it to be available now. Yet early
Georgian pamphlets would have had to have been stored somewhere for
over a century, most likely in private collections in country house libraries or
attics. Pamphlets on old-fashioned topics, possessing little commercial value,
were, though, particularly vulnerable to being lost upon cleaning or the sale
of homes. Works by famous authors were more likely to survive, as well as
works which appealed to the landed elite. A work which criticized landowners
was not likely to be preserved in their homes. Other classes of people were not
as able to maintain collections of printed ephemera for several generations.Their chosen reading material may have been subject to higher rates of
attrition. Thus, an author like Hutcheson who was able to get large numbers
of pamphlets printed and who appealed to the landed elite might have more
surviving works in the archive.
In the Goldsmith’s-Kress Library approximately forty of Hutcheson’spamphlets are preserved? Most of these pamphlets were published between
1718 and 1723. Only ten of Hutcheson’s works have a named publisher and
only four have a named seller. The majority probably were self-financed tractswhich he dispersed gratis. The pamphlets were primarily political literature,
designed to either to influence opinion and/or to increase Hutcheson’s political
profile. Thus, not all the works were related to economic issues. A few were
related to his other concerns, such as his attempts to prove that he was not a
Jacobite.23 Hutcheson had the financial means to pay his publishers, because
of his wife’s fortune. Between 1720 and 1721, he published at least fifteen
(slightly) different pamphlets, rehashing his arguments. Second and even third
editions of his work appeared within the same twelve month period.
Published after the South Sea Bubble, the writer “Freeholder of
Great-Britain” wrote a lengthy poem praising Hutcheson and claiming that
Hutcheson’s alternative scheme for the National Debt would have been
successful. The anonymous author did not, however, discuss the nuts and
bolts of Hutcheson’s scheme, but he extolled Hutcheson nevertheless, writing
“If Your elab’rate Schemes had once obtain’d fNo Mis’ries had the Common
96 People known.” The writer looked to the day when “No Clouds of Malice shall
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thy Fame O’ercast.”24 There is no way of knowing who wrote this, whether
he or she was paid to do so, and if so, by whom. Yet the date of publication
(1722) is significant for it is the year of the Atterbury Plot, when Hutcheson
was under intense attack for allegedly espousing Jacobitism. Therefore, the
publication of this anonymous pamphlet—appearing at a time when he was
especially beleaguered—is not good evidence that Hutcheson was admired for
his economic writings. Possibly, he could have commissioned it himself, which
may explain the use of a pseudonym.
Hutcheson’s pamphlets were typically lengthy and difficult to read, but
at least some authors responded in writing to his arguments. For example, John
Crookshanks, another contemporary political writer, criticized Hutcheson’s
scheme for the national debt and also impugned his calculations regarding
the size of the national debt.25 Hutcheson himself put great weight on his
careful calculations, devoting pages in pamphlets to detailing his estimates of
expenditures and the like. He defended himself from Crookshank’s criticisms
with a pamphlet which ran to two editions.26
Like most pamphieteers of the era, Hutcheson was mainly concerned
with promoting a political agenda, and any economic arguments included were
clearly secondary. Hutcheson’s pamphlets were not meant to be reference texts.
It is unclear how closely they were read, or understood, by his readership.
Hutcheson’s contemporaries generally lacked formal instruction in economic
concepts, so readers tended to focus upon the political and moral arguments
which constituted substantial portions of the text.
Hutcheson’s proposal to eliminate the national debt was his alternative
to the South Sea scheme. In a tract published in 1717, Hutcheson claimed
that government creditors contributed nothing to the public.27 He overlooked
the following facts: wars would be much harder to conduct without credit;
creditors could lose their money, and they suffered the opportunity costs
of tying up funds. (A famous example of a monarch reneging on debt
occurred during Hutcheson’s own lifetime in 1672, with the actions of King
Charles II. Known as the Stop of the Exchequer, it ruined a generation of
goldsmith bankers and would have been well-known to Hutcheson and his
contemporaries.) Hutcheson’s refusal to allow these points puts him squarely
against the monied interest. Indeed, he preferred the traditional idea of land
as the basis of economic and political power. He stated that land sales were
justifiable to pay his proposed tax as the remainder of the estate would be more
valuable. He reasoned that if the national debt were paid off swiftly, taxes and
duties would cease. The economy would be stimulated and the price level
and interest rates would fall. Landowners could then fund more investment in
improving their estates. The general improvement in the economy purportedly
would lead to more land purchases and the price of land would rise.
Hutcheson’s string of assumptions is faulty. First, if the country
survived the massive burden ofpaying off the debt quickly, economic dislocation
would be likely to ensue. Even if it did not, politicians would not reduce
public spending to nothing and cut taxes and duties completely. If there were
a boom, this might lead to inflation rather than deflation. Also, landowners 97
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might spend money on consumption rather than investment. Finally, for land
to be sold, there must be a buyer. Hutcheson might find the landed elite had
sold their properties to people he would not approve of, such as foreigners, or
lead to the breakup of many estates entirely. Landownership was essential for
many political and social rights, such as voting rights. Therefore, the transfer
of landownership had wider ramifications than the mere transfer of an asset.
Even during the South Sea Bubble, Hutcheson claimed that it was the
landed class who could reduce the interest on the national debt.28 Those who
were proficient in the markets were merely “birds and beasts of prey.” He
advocated forcing investors to hold onto their shares for at least a year.29 This,
he felt, would guard against stock-jobbing. Yet such a requirement would
also undermine one of the key advantages of stock markets — their liquidity.
Hutcheson clearly thought that an inflexible system, like that of land sales,was best. Similarly, he thought that the state should only spend the money it
accumulated within one year. This requirement too seems needlessly inflexible.
Given Hutcheson’s plans to reduce the liquidity of financial assets,it is puzzling that Dale eulogized him as the father of investment analysis.
According to Dale, Hutcheson showed that the South Sea scheme was flawed
before the bubble burst.3°However, Hutcheson had thought that the scheme
would succeed.3 Before the bill to enable the conversion of more government
debt, Hutcheson wrote that the company could:
Swallow up the Bank [of Englandi, and the East-India Company, andthe whole, or as much of the Trade of Great Britain, as they shall think
fit: And there is reason to believe that all future Parliaments will be only
Grand Committees of that formidable Society[. . ]32
After the crash, Hutcheson asserted that if the scheme “had been managed
with any tolerable Prudence, and attended with success” it would have ended
in “the sapping of the British constitution.”33
As Dale has emphasized, Hutcheson’s calculations rested on a set of
assumptions, including his estimation that the South Sea Company would
cease to exist in 1727. (The government could, theoretically, have taken
over the government debt held by the South Sea Company from 1727 whichwould end the company’s role in debt restructuring.) Hutcheson then provided
other calculations without this assumption. Dale noted with approval that
Hutcheson used modern techniques such as the calculation of the present value
of a future dividend stream at a time when corporate accounting was in itsinfancy.34 Yet Hutcheson (as well as his opponents) were generating estimates
regarding the company’s current and future finances, without the benefit of a
complete set of accounts. Hutcheson’s calculations were his attempt to see if
the conversion of government debt were possible. Ex post, it is clear that such
unwieldy debts were converted. Therefore, the problems of the national debt
were ameliorated, even if many shareholders incurred substantial losses. In
fact, the South Sea conversions were far more practical than Hutcheson’s own
98 plans for the national debt.
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While many of Hutcheson’s writings on the South Sea scheme
appeared after the bubble burst, one of his pamphlets was published in 1720,
at the height of the bubble, and it concerned the last wave of subscriptions to
the scheme.35 In this work, Hutcheson makes some salient points. Hutcheson
argued that share prices were so high as to be unsustainable; in other words,
he contended that this was the high point of a financial bubble which had to
eventually burst. As Dale highlights, Hutcheson made various calculations to
argue his point, using a range of different assumptions for valuations of the
company, discount rates etc.36 The minutiae of these calculations did not need
to be correct for Hutcheson to appear to be right in hindsight.
Claiming that the trades undertaken were akin to gambling or else
subject to unfair practices, Hutcheson argued that the buyers of shares were
being defrauded by the sellers.37 He contended that certain trades should come
under the terms of the Gaming Act of 1710, which restricted the sums which
could be lost and listed punishments for cheating.38Hutchesonwanted contracts
altered retrospectively to favor the buyers of shares.39 First, he wanted anyone
who was paying for their shares by installments (the subscription shares) to
be allowed to cancel the arrangement. Second, he wanted any government
creditors who had exchanged their claims on the government for South Sea
shares to be able to exchange them back again. He excluded the first wave
of subscribers from this option claiming that they had made a good bargain.
(His willingness to help government creditors is in sharp contrast to his earlier
claim that they contributed nothing to the nation40)He invoked a precedent
from 1690, when holders of debentures who had sold their claims at low prices
were allowed recompense under an Act of Parliament.4’He also claimed that
many of the gainers in the bubble were foreigners, who were taking gold and
silver out of the country, or else social upstarts who were ruining the landed
elite.42 In a tract written immediately after the bubble, Hutcheson argued that
successful investors should remit most or all of their stock-trading gains to
those investors who had lost money in the bubble. Investors who gained were
merely “blood-suckers,” according to Hutcheson.43 His arguments about the
subscription shares were valid. However, taken as a whole, his work contains
very little economic theory. It is possible, with hindsight, to pick out one or
two sensible remarks from a larger number of uninformed ones.
After the bubble burst, Hutcheson considered the effects of allowing the
Bank of England and the East India Company to take over (or engraft) some of
the South Sea Company’s capital. As usual, he employed lengthy calculations,
but no economic theory. In another pamphlet, he argued that the engraftment
scheme would not work.45 He proposed changing the terms of the subscription
contracts. He frequently mentioned the collapse of the nation’s credit in his
work. However, he seemed unaware that penalizing a section of the investing
public would further damage the web of credit. In fact, he would be penalizing
those who understood something of business and finance, in favor of those
who did not. It would also cast a shadow over any future transactions in the
stock market, as people would fear arbitrary confiscations. Hutcheson’s place
in the House of Commons’ committee gave him access to raw data which he 99
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so assiduously used. However, he did not seem to look much beyond it at thewider questions of how the economy worked, nor did he seem to have muchunderstanding, or love for, the new monied interest.
In the historiography of the South Sea Bubble, Hutcheson enjoysposthumous fame. Supporters like Dale, selectively quoting from Hutcheson’sarguments, have encouraged the belief that Hutcheson was a savant. At firstglance, Hutcheson’s writings seem to bolster the traditional view that thebubble was the result of a gambling, speculative mania, and Hutcheson mayappear to have been a shrewd analyst of the stock market. In fact, though,far from being a genius, Hutcheson did not really strive to discover how theeconomy truly functioned. He stuck to normative statements about how itshould function, to maintain the existing landed elite. Hutcheson dislikedthe South Sea scheme, in part because he had a rival scheme of his own.Hutcheson’s ulterior motives, rather than any profound insights, may havemotivated him to attack the South Sea’s debt conversion scheme. Hutchesonwas well known to contemporaries as a politician, but his economic writingswere not ground-breaking. Rather, he sought to maintain a social structurebased around land-ownership and he vehemently opposed the rise of themonied interest. The survival of his pamphlets may be due to his ability to self-finance large print runs. Because he appealed to them, the landed elite may
have been more inclined to preserve his pamphlets in their homes, while someother works by his contemporaries have not survived. Hutcheson’s case showsthe difficulties of analyzing economic writings and pamphlet texts from theearly modern era. Often, too, his works have been quoted out of context withno regard to Hutcheson’s own political agenda. Thus, Hutcheson’s works donot authoritatively prove that an irrational gambling mania developed around
the South Sea stock nor do they convincingly prove that the South Sea schemewas doomed to fail.
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